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When Cheaper is Better: Fee Determination
in the Market for Equity Mutual Funds
Abstract
In this paper, we develop a model of the market for equity mutual funds that
captures three key characteristics of this market. First, there is competition among
funds. Second, fund managers’ ability is not observed by investors before making their
investment decisions. And third, some investors do not make optimal use of all available
information. The main results of the paper are that 1) price competition is compatible
with positive mark-ups in equilibrium; and 2) worse-performing funds set fees that
are greater or equal than those set by better-performing funds. These predictions are
supported by available empirical evidence.
JEL classification codes: L13, L15, G23, D80.
Keywords: mutual fund fees, mutual fund performance, product quality, asymmetric
information, bounded rationality.
1 Introduction
In 2003, total mutual fund assets in the U.S. were worth 7.4 trillion dollars and constituted
an estimated 18.4 percent of the total financial wealth of U.S. households (Investment
Company Institute, 2004). The increasing reliance of American investors on mutual funds
has raised concerns among industry commentators and regulators alike about the extent
of competition in the industry and, in particular, about the level of fees that mutual funds
charge investors for their services.1 These concerns have prompted regulators to commission
reports (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2000; General Accounting Office, 2000)
to analyze the evolution and determinants of mutual fund fees. More recently, a series
of scandals,2 have triggered regulatory initiatives that, among other things, strengthen
mutual fund fee disclosure requirements so as to promote price competition in the industry.3
Underlying this debate is a long overdue question: How are fees determined in the mutual
fund market? To address this question, in this paper, we develop a model of the market
for equity mutual funds.
One of the main concerns fueling the debate over mutual fund fees, and a key motivation
for the regulatory changes requiring improved fee disclosure, has been the degree to which
investors are aware of the fees associated with fund investments and their impact on the
return of those investments. A survey by the SEC and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (Alexander et al., 1997) reports that fewer than one in six fund investors
understand that higher fund expenses–which are deducted from the fund’s assets and mostly
consist of management fees–lead to lower returns. The survey also documents that investors
are not familiar with the level of fees they are paying for mutual fund services (not even
20% of the respondents was able to give an estimate of the expenses paid for their largest
mutual fund) and reveals other gaps in financial literacy. Similar results have been obtained
in studies by Capon et al. (1996) and Wilcox (2003). More recently, a study by Barber et
1For example, in a recent article about the topic in The Economist, one could read: “Retail investors
[...] have seen precious little competition on prices. Even for wretched performance, reductions in fees have
been all too rare.” (The Economist, 2004).
2See, for instance, Dwyer, Borrus and Young (2003) for an account of these scandals.
3The Securities and Exchange Commission has issued a rule establishing stronger disclosure requirements
for mutual funds (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2004). The “Mutual Funds Integrity and Fee
Transparency Act of 2003”, which imposes strict governance and disclosure requirements, passed the U.S.
House overwhelmingly in November, 2003.
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al. (2005) has provided further evidence of investors’ difficulties understanding the effects
of mutual fund fees. In light of these findings, it is our view that a satisfactory model of the
mutual fund market should account for the presence of a significant fraction of investors
who make less than optimal use of the information available when making their investment
decisions.
The model developed in this paper has three main ingredients, which, we believe, char-
acterize the market for equity mutual funds. In the U.S., investors can choose from a large
pool of mutual funds, even for relatively narrowly defined investment categories. Therefore,
the first ingredient of our model is competition among–possibly many–funds for investors’
money. This ingredient is key, because we would like to know whether existing concerns
about the level of fees charged by mutual funds can still be warranted in the presence of
mutual fund competition. Since our main focus is the market for equity mutual funds, the
second ingredient is quality uncertainty: different fund managers have different abilities to
generate returns, but those abilities are not known ex ante by investors. Even though in
actual markets, funds’ past returns could be used as a signal of performance, this signal
is, at best, highly noisy. Therefore, the assumption that quality is not observable appears
as a reasonable first approximation. The third ingredient is the presence of a fraction of
investors who do not make optimal use of all available information when making their
investment decisions. We label these investors unsophisticated.
The model enables us to address several questions: 1) Should we expect price compe-
tition among funds to bring equilibrium profits down to zero? 2) Will high-quality funds
drive low-quality funds out of the market? If low-quality funds manage to survive in equi-
librium, 3) will high-quality funds charge higher fees, so that, in equilibrium, all investors
earn the same expected net returns? If, on the contrary, net returns differ across funds, 4)
which funds will be more likely to overcharge investors: high- or low-quality funds? These
questions lie at the heart of the debate over the extent of competition in the mutual fund
industry and are of key importance in evaluating proposed regulatory changes. The model
shows that, in equilibrium: 1) funds earn positive profits; 2) high- and low-quality funds
coexist; 3) high-quality funds never charge higher fees and may charge lower fees; and that,
as a consequence, 4) low-quality funds greatly overcharge investors.
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The intuition behind these, perhaps surprising, results is as follows. In the mutual fund
market, the revenues earned by a mutual fund are the product of its fee and the fund asset
value. Therefore, in a setting in which quality is unobservable, high-quality funds–namely
those that deliver a higher value–may be able to differentiate themselves by setting low
fees. If those fees are low enough, low-quality funds would not break even by imitating
them. Unable to compete for the sophisticated segment of the market, low-quality funds
would focus instead on extracting rents from unsophisticated investors. It should be noted
that, although the presence of unsophisticated investors is necessary to obtain this sort of
price differentiation in equilibrium, it is not sufficient. The model’s results follow from the
interaction between asymmetric information and the existence of those investors.
The assumption that fund quality is completely unobservable can seem unrealistic if, as
indicated by the empirical evidence, past mutual fund returns have some value as predic-
tors of future performance. The complexity involved in evaluating and forecasting mutual
fund performance, however, suggests that past returns are only a noisy signal of future per-
formance. The assumption of asymmetric information is, therefore, still reasonable given
that managers possess skills, technology and access to return-relevant data that investors
lack. In section 4, we investigate the effects of allowing investors to observe a signal of
fund quality prior to making their purchase decision. Our results suggests that, as long as
the signal is only imperfectly correlated with fund performance, there are still separating
equilibria like the ones described above.
The available empirical evidence is fully consistent with our model: funds not only fail
to adjust fees so as to offset differences in before-fee returns, but, on the contrary, funds
of lower quality charge higher fees. Elton et al. (1993), for instance, document significant
differences in after-fee returns across mutual funds and show that funds that charge higher
fees deliver significantly lower before-fee returns. Additional evidence provided by Gruber
(1996), Carhart (1997), Harless and Peterson (1998), and Chevalier and Ellison (1999) has
consistently confirmed the power of high fees to predict underperformance. Surprisingly,
this anomalous pattern in the data has not been explained by any previous formal model
of the mutual fund industry.
Although there exists a relatively large theoretical literature, initiated by Bhattacharya
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and Pfleiderer (1985), that aims at characterizing the optimal compensation contract in
a delegated portfolio management problem,4 few studies have analyzed fund fees as the
outcome of the strategic interaction of competing mutual funds. Recently, Hortacsu and
Syverson (2004) have developed a search model of the market for S&P 500 index funds.
In contrast to our paper, however, they analyze a sector in which financial performance
differences across funds are relatively small and thus focus on non-portfolio fund differen-
tiation and search frictions as potential sources of fee dispersion. In another recent paper,
Berk and Green (2004) have proposed a model of the mutual fund market with no infor-
mational asymmetries or search frictions. The goal of their model is to explain why money
may rationally follow past good performance even when past performance is not a strong
predictor of future performance. The paper is, however, silent about the determinants of
the observed distribution of fees. Das and Sundaram (2002) and Metrick and Zeckhauser
(1999) have analyzed fee setting in a duopoly context with asymmetric information about
fund quality. While Das and Sundaram (2002) compare the performance of two types of
incentive schemes for fund managers in such a context, the goal of Metrick and Zeckhauser
(1999) is to explain why high- and low-quality producers may charge the same price in cer-
tain markets (including the mutual fund market), and is, thus, closely related to ours. We
discuss their results in section 2. In another related paper, Nanda et al. (2000) have devel-
oped a model where mutual fund managers of observable quality bear the cost of stochastic
investment redemptions, and therefore wish to attract investors who are less likely to ex-
perience liquidity needs. In equilibrium, more skilled fund managers impose exit fees and
cater to investors with lower liquidity needs, while less skilled managers become liquidity
providers. Finally, Christoffersen and Musto (2002) have recently explored empirically the
effect of investors’ performance sensitivity on fund fees.
Our paper is also related to the more general literature on the role of prices as signals
of quality. In this literature, high prices generally signal high quality (e.g., Bagwell and
Riordan, 1991), although in some contexts involving repeated purchases, it has been shown
that low introductory prices can be used as signals of quality (Schmalensee, 1978). This
set of work, however, has mostly focused on the case of a single seller of unknown quality.
4See, e.g., Palomino and Prat (2003) for a recent contribution.
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Only recently, Fluet and Garella (2002) and Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) have studied
price and advertising signaling for the case of a duopoly. In their models, high-quality firms
charge higher prices in any separating equilibrium. Of related interest is a recent working
paper by Gabaix and Laibson (2003), in which the authors argue that product–or pricing–
complexity can allow firms to obtain positive mark-ups in equilibrium and that increases
in competition may actually exacerbate the problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the benchmark model;
Section 3 extends the model to include unsophisticated investors and section 4 assesses
the consequences of the existence of a noisy signal of fund quality; Section 5 discusses the
available evidence on the relationship between performance and fees, and, finally, section 6
concludes.
2 A Model of Fee Determination in the Market for Mutual
Funds
Consider a simple setting in which there is a continuum of investors of mass one who
have one dollar to invest, and N mutual fund managers. These managers can be of two
types depending on their ability: good (g) and bad (b). G-managers earn gross expected
return Rg, and b-managers Rb, where Rg > Rb, and Rg > 1. Returns are assumed to
be independent of fees, so we can abstract from moral hazard problems. The ex ante
distribution of types is given by the probability p that a manager is good. Once the types
are realized, fund managers observe their quality but not the quality of their rivals and
decide what fraction e of the fund’s final asset value to charge to investors. The assumption
that fees are determined as a fraction of asset value is made to reflect actual practice in
the mutual fund industry. In section 5, we discuss in greater detail the different fees paid
by mutual fund investors.
Investors do not observe quality, so they decide where to invest on the basis of the prior
distribution and the fees charged by the different funds. As argued in the introduction,
even if fund quality could be inferred from different sources of information, such as past
returns, evaluating and forecasting mutual fund performance is a very complex and costly
task for retail investors. Fund managers, on the other hand, possess skills, technology and
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access to data about their portfolios and organization that investors lack. We therefore
believe that fund managers can be expected to be better informed about their own ability
to generate returns than investors. We discuss this issue in greater detail in section 4,
where we allow investors to be imperfectly informed about fund quality.
We will assume that a fraction γ of all investors are unsophisticated, in the sense that
they do not make optimal use of all available information. Since we will first analyze the
case with no unsophisticated investors, we postpone the discussion of the precise form in
which these investors behave until they are introduced in section 3.
The costs of managing the fund are cw, where w is the amount of money managed by
the fund manager. It is assumed that costs are low enough to make it profitable for g-funds
to operate if their type is known. We assume that all market participants are risk-neutral,5
and that the only alternative investment is a risk-free asset paying a zero interest rate.
Therefore, the maximum fee a fund of type k can charge if its type is known is such that
the net return for investors is equal to one: Rk(1− e) = 1, that is e = Rk−1Rk . Therefore, the
assumption that g-funds may profitably operate if their type is known can be expressed as
follows:
Assumption 1
Rg − 1
Rg
>
c
Rg
,
where the right-hand side of the inequality is the break-even fee for g-funds.
We also assume that, given c, b-funds may find it profitable to operate for some fee less
than one hundred percent:
Assumption 2 Rb > c.
5The risk-neutrality assumption enables us to focus on a single mutual fund characteristic, expected
return, so rational investors will always choose the fund with the highest (after-expense) expected return.
We could alternatively drop risk neutrality and replace expected return for a measure of mutual fund risk-
adjusted performance. A commonly used proxy for risk adjusted-performance is the fund’s alpha, defined
as the fund’s expected return in excess of that implied by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or
an Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) -type model. Under the CAPM assumptions, it can be shown that
combining a fund with positive alpha with the market portfolio strictly improves the investor’s risk-return
trade-off. Under the APT assumptions, a strategy long in a fund with positive alpha and short in risk-free
asset and in the factor-mimicking portfolios, is an arbitrage. Therefore, investors constrained in the amount
of money they can invest in mutual funds, would optimally choose the mutual fund with the highest (after-
expense) alpha, regardless of their risk aversion. If all agents agree on the definition of alpha, then our
model is unchanged.
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We denote by ek the fee charged by a manager of type k as a proportion of the value
of the fund at the end of the period and assume that there are no other fees. Therefore,
the amount paid by an investor who invests w dollars in a fund of type k is wekRk, and
payoffs are w(ekRk − c) for the manager and w(1− ek)Rk for the investor.
Finally, the timing of decisions is as follows. First, managers simultaneously set fees.
Then investors decide where to invest. We make the assumption that, if several funds
have the same net expected returns, investors allocate their wealth among them with equal
probability.
2.1 Benchmark Case: Complete Information
Before solving the model, it is instructive to investigate the relationship between fund
quality and fees when there are no unsophisticated investors and quality is observed both
by competing funds and by investors. It is straightforward to show that, in this case,
b-funds will be driven out of the market whenever there are g-funds:
Proposition 1 With complete information, there do not exist equilibria in which both fund
types operate simultaneously.
Proof. First, note that for both types of funds to have a positive market share:
(1− eb)Rb = (1− eg)Rg, (1)
which implies that eb < eg.
With complete information the number of funds of each type is given and commonly
known. We study first the case in which there is only one g-fund active and then the case
in which there are at least two g-funds. So, suppose first that there is only one g-fund.
For b-funds to operate eb ≥ cRb > cRg , which implies that eg > cRg . Therefore, if eb ≥ cRb ,
it would be profitable for the g-fund to lower eg slightly and attract the whole market. It
follows that, in equilibrium, b-funds cannot operate. The g-fund will set the minimum fee
that guarantees that b-funds do not want to enter, which is given by:
(1− eg)Rg = (1− c
Rb
)Rb (2)
7
If there are several g-funds, the same argument applies for any eg > cRg . The only
possible equilibrium fee is eg = cRg <
c
Rb
, so b-funds remain inactive.
Therefore, good and bad funds cannot coexist in equilibrium with complete information:
whenever it is profitable for b-funds to operate, it is also profitable for g-funds to lower
fees.6 As a result, b-funds are driven out of the market.
2.2 Asymmetric Information
We now investigate what happens when there is asymmetric information regarding funds’
ability to generate returns. To understand the contribution of the model’s different assump-
tions, we maintain the assumption that there are no unsophisticated investors. We use the
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as our equilibrium concept and focus only on pure-strategy
symmetric equilibria (i.e., equilibria in which all funds of the same type play the same pure
strategy). To limit equilibrium multiplicity, we require investors’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs
to satisfy the property that they do not assign positive probability to managers setting
fees that are certain to yield them a negative profit. That is, investors cannot assign a
positive probability to a fund of type k choosing a fee less than cRk . Therefore, throughout
the paper, by equilibrium we will refer to a pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
satisfying this restriction on investors’ beliefs.
First, note that in a separating equilibrium in which both types are ever active simul-
taneously, it has to be the case that net returns for investors are equal across types, since,
otherwise, investors would not invest with the two types when both are available. Equality
of net returns, in turn, implies that the expected market shares of g- and b-funds also have
to be equal,7 since investors are indifferent between both types and, therefore, allocate the
money across funds with equal probability. But this implies that, if eg > eb, it would be
optimal for b-managers to imitate g-managers. On the other hand, if eg < eb, no rational
investor that observes both fees would invest with a b-manager. Therefore:
Proposition 2 If all investors react optimally to differences in expected payoffs, there are
6In models of vertical differentiation (e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1982), equilibria in which low- and high-
quality producers coexist–with the former charging lower prices–are possible if consumers display differences
in their willingness to pay for quality. In the mutual fund industry, however, where the good provided by
sellers is end-of-period dollars, one would expect that all consumers have the same willingness to pay for
quality: nobody would pay more cents than anybody else for a dollar.
7The expectation is taken over the possible realizations of the number of b- and g-funds.
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no separating equilibria in which both fund-types operate simultaneously.
According to Proposition 2, we should observe no fee dispersion in equilibrium: for any
realization of the number of b- and g-funds, all the funds with a positive market share must
charge the same fees. Equilibria at which b- and g-funds are active simultaneously and the
latter charge higher fees are not possible.
It is straightforward to show that, with asymmetric information, equilibria like the one
obtained with complete information, in which only g-funds are active and make zero profits,
are not possible. The reason is that any g-fund faces a positive probability of competing
only against b-funds. Therefore, there exists a strategy that guarantees positive expected
profits to g-funds: setting a fee greater than the break-even fee for g-funds ( cRg ), but lower
than the break-even fee for b-funds ( cRb ). Such a fee guarantees positive profits if the fund
is ever able to attract any money and, as long as it is not too high, ensures that the fund
would attract investors’ money at least when there are no competing g-funds. The fact
that g-funds have a strategy that guarantees positive expected profits immediately rules
out Bertrand-like equilibria, like the one that results from complete information. It is
possible to show, though, that, for a broad range of parameter values, there are equilibria
in which both types of funds are active, set the same fee and obtain positive profits.
With complete information, equilibria with positive profits are not possible. If there is
asymmetric information, however, undercutting other funds’ fees can be interpreted by
investors as a signal of low quality, so that, if investors are sufficiently pessimistic in their
assessment of deviating funds, equilibria with positive profits can arise.8
We would like to note here that the existence of an equilibrium at which funds of different
qualities set the same fee has already been proposed by Metrick and Zeckhauser (1999),
although in a very different context. Metrick and Zeckhauser (1999) study a vertically-
differentiated duopoly characterized by sequential price setting (with good funds setting
fees–front-end loads–before bad funds) and by investor heterogeneity along two dimensions:
on the one hand, different investors value the “good” provided by mutual funds differently;
and, on the other hand, some investors can observe quality, while others cannot. In this
8We omit the proof of the existence of this type of equilibrium, since it can be obtained as a special case
of the pooling equilibria analyzed in the next section.
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context, an equilibrium in which both funds set the same price can arise when the qualities
are similar enough. The reason is that competition for the investors who can observe quality
is strong in this case. As a result, the good fund may find it optimal to set a fee low enough
to force bad funds out of the informed segment of the market. It is important to note that,
in their model, good funds attract more money than bad funds in a pooling equilibrium,
since the latter do not get any money from informed investors. It is also worth noting that,
in their model, there are also separating equilibria in which both funds are active and good
funds charge higher fees. In our model, these equilibria are not possible.
3 Unsophisticated Investors
In the introduction, we argued that a satisfactory model of the mutual fund industry
should account for the empirical evidence that a significant fraction of investors do not
make optimal use of all available information when making their investment decisions. For
example, in a survey conducted by Capon et al. (1996), more than 70% of respondents did
not know whether their mutual funds invested mainly in domestic or international stocks,
or whether they invested mainly in equity or fixed income. Especially notable is investors’
ignorance of the fees charged by their mutual funds. In particular, a survey commissioned
by the SEC and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Alexander et al., 1997) shows
that 81.2 % of respondents could not give an estimate of the expenses of the largest fund
they owned and, of those investors, only 43% claimed to have known their largest fund’s
expenses at the time they first invested in the fund. Investors’ ignorance of management
fees is consistent with the importance that they assign to these fees when determining
their investment choices: Capon et al. (1996) report that the mean importance given by
individual investors to management fees as a selection criterion is 2.28 in a scale from 1
to 6, and Wilcox (2003) finds similar results when inferring investors’ selection criteria
from actual choices. If investors weight any fees at all, they consider load fees and not
management fees (Barber et al., 2005).
Investors’ insensitivity to management fees may reflect the lack of salience of these fees
(Barber et al., 2005): management fees are paid over time, are calculated as a fraction of
the value of the investment, and are, therefore, hard to translate into (discounted) dollar
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terms. Further, since expenses are typically in the range of 1-2%, some investors may
underestimate the long run effects of apparently small differences in expenses or code as
equal expenses with different long run effects. The problem of processability of information
on mutual fund expense ratios is stressed by Cox and Payne (2005), who apply Slovic’s
(1972) concreteness principle to argue that investors tend to accept the information on
fees in the format it is given, rather than expending cognitive effort to transform it, and,
thus, provide a justification to the SEC’s new rule requiring funds to to disclose expenses in
dollar terms. However, Cox and Payne (2005) also argue that these disclosure requirements
may not be sufficient and that management fees will be underweighted in decisions unless
they are expressed relative to those of comparable funds.
The evidence, thus, shows that the behavior of a large fraction of investors is markedly
different from that of the sophisticated investors we considered in the previous section,
who not only knew the fees charged by all funds, but rightly understood in equilibrium
the relation between fees and expected performance. In this section, in addition to sophis-
ticated investors, we include a fraction of investors whose investment choices are largely
unresponsive to fees. More specifically, we assume that the probability of an unsophisti-
cated investor investing in a given mutual fund is the same for all funds and independent
of the fee charged by the fund as long as that fee is below a threshold value eU . This
threshold reflects the fact that, even though investors may not be fully aware of the exact
value of fees or of their implications for net returns when they lie within a reasonable range,
they would detect fees that are conspicuously high. We take a conservative approach and
assume that this threshold is relatively low and given by:
R(1− eU ) = 1,
where R = pRg+(1− p)Rb is the expected gross return. That is, unsophisticated investors
invest only if the expected net return, given the distribution of fund types, is at least
as high as that of the alternative asset. Arguably, this requirement demands too much
sophistication from unsophisticated investors. As we discuss below, however, our results
do not depend on the specific choice of eU and are consistent with both higher and lower
values of this variable. Finally, we assume that unsophisticated investors do not infer any
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information about a fund’s quality from the fee it charges. Again, we could somewhat
relax this assumption. However, as we argue below, we do not think that doing this would
increase the realism of our assumptions and would unnecessarily complicate the results.
To derive the market equilibrium when there is a fraction γ of unsophisticated investors,
note first that a reasoning similar to Proposition 2 still applies in this case: in equilibrium,
b-managers and g-managers cannot both serve the sophisticated market segment and charge
different fees. If eg > eb, b-managers would mimic g-managers’ pricing strategy. If eg < eb,
sophisticated investors would not invest in b-funds. Therefore, if the presence of unsophisti-
cated investors allows for the existence of separating equilibria in which both fund types are
active simultaneously, sophisticated investors must prefer one type of fund over the other.
The possibility that b-funds offer a higher net return in equilibrium can be ruled out, since
it is straightforward to show that there cannot exist separating equilibria in which g-funds
serve only unsophisticated investors and b-funds serve sophisticated investors. Therefore,
we investigate next whether there can exist separating equilibria in which both fund types
are active simultaneously and in which b-funds serve only unsophisticated investors as long
as there are competing g-funds. Obviously, for these equilibria to exist, b-funds must be
able to at least break even by charging eU , since, otherwise, they would never be active.
Assumption 3 eU > cRb .
The following conditions must hold at this type of equilibrium:
wUg (Rgeg − c) ≥ wUb (Rgeb − c) (NIg)
wUb (Rbeb − c) ≥ wUg (Rbeg − c) (NIb)
wUb (Rbeb − c) ≥ 0, (Pb)
where wUk is the wealth that a fund setting ek expects to obtain conditional on all other
funds playing the equilibrium strategies. Note that eg < eb implies that if b-funds serve
any sophisticated investors at all, they will do so only when there are no g-funds in the
market. Since all funds get the same share of unsophisticated investors’ money, it follows
that wUg > w
U
b . Note also that if eg < eb, w
U
g > w
U
b must hold for condition (NIg) to be
satisfied.
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The first two conditions above are no-imitation constraints for g- and b-funds, respec-
tively, and the last condition is a participation constraint for b-funds. A participation
constraint for g-funds is not necessary, because it is implied by (NIb) and (Pb). Note that,
since wUg > w
U
b , condition (NIb) requires that eg < eb: in this type of equilibrium, g-funds
must set lower fees.
Fees also have to be low enough to convince both sophisticated and unsophisticated
investors to participate:
eg ≤ Rg − 1
Rg
(3)
eb ≤ eU (4)
Finally, it cannot be profitable for b- or g-funds to deviate and set an out-of-equilibrium
fee. To evaluate these deviations, we need to make assumptions about sophisticated in-
vestors’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs. To prove the results below, we assume that sophisticated
investors interpret any deviation from equilibrium as coming from a b-fund unless it yields
negative profits for such a fund. These extreme beliefs are chosen to simplify the proofs
and are not necessary. For our results to hold, all that is required is that sophisticated
investors assign a sufficiently high probability to a deviator being of low quality. The next
proposition shows that there are parameter values such that all the above conditions hold
simultaneously and there are no profitable out-of-equilibrium deviations (all omitted proofs
can be found in the appendix):
Proposition 3 There exist separating equilibria with unsophisticated investors at which:
1. b-funds serve unsophisticated investors only and charge e∗b = eU .
2. g-funds charge e∗g >
c
Rb
and serve both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.
3. e∗b > e
∗
g.
Figures ??-?? show that separating equilibria of this sort can exist for reasonable pa-
rameter values. For each possible value of γ (plotted along the x-axis), the figures graph
the minimum and maximum values of c (plotted along the y-axis) for which these equilibria
can exist.
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The equilibria described in Proposition 3 are the only possible separating equilibria,
but there may also exist pooling equilibria for certain parameter values. At these pooling
equilibria, g- and b-funds set the same fee, and both types make positive profits.
Proposition 4 For some parameter values, there exist pooling equilibria in which both
types set ep > cRb .
Given the complexity of the conditions that define both the pooling and the separating
equilibria, we have not attempted to ascertain which type of equilibrium holds for a greater
range of parameter values or investors’ beliefs. As we did above for the case of separating
equilibria, we have numerically found the range of values of c and γ consistent with the
existence of a pooling equilibria for the case in which p = 12 . Figures ??-?? show that
pooling equilibria can also exist for reasonable parameter values.
Inspection of propositions 3 and 4 seems to indicate that quality is not rewarded in
the market for mutual funds, since g-funds charge fees that are lower or equal than those
charged by b-funds. Quality is, however, rewarded by higher profits: at any equilibrium,
g-funds obtain higher profits than b-funds. At a separating equilibrium, the no-imitation
constraint (NIg), ensures that wUg (Rgeg− c) ≥ wUb (Rgeb− c), which, since Rg > Rb, implies
that wUg (Rgeg − c) > wUb (Rbeb − c). At a pooling equilibrium, all funds charge the same
fee, ep and get the same market share. The fact that Rg > Rb immediately implies that
1
N (Rgep − c) > 1N (Rbep − c).
The model in this section departs from the benchmark complete information model
in two dimensions, and it is instructive to see how each of these dimensions contributes
to the existence of separating equilibria like the ones described in Proposition 3. First,
the existence of unsophisticated investors allows b-funds to survive while setting fees that
differ from those of g-funds. As we saw in the previous section, this would not be possible
if all investors held correct beliefs in equilibrium and could move their money freely. In this
respect, our model resembles models of price dispersion based on the presence of search costs
(like Salop and Stiglitz, 1977), where impediments to search allow firms charging higher
prices to obtain positive market shares. Second, the presence of asymmetric information
limits the competitive pressure on g-funds. If sophisticated investors could observe fund
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quality, competition among g-funds would drive eg down to cRg , but such a situation could
not be an equilibrium with unsophisticated investors, because g-funds can set a higher fee,
sell to unsophisticated investors and make a positive profit. It should thus be emphasized
that the existence of unsophisticated investors alone cannot generate separating equilibria
with both fund types active.
In light of Proposition 3, it is worth reevaluating whether our characterization of unso-
phisticated investors implies that these investors behave in a way that would be considered
unreasonable even for investors such as those described by the survey evidence discussed
at the beginning of this section. A possible concern is that:
eU >
Rb − 1
Rb
,
where Rb−1Rb is the fee that guarantees the reservation return when investing with a b-fund.
Therefore, at a separating equilibrium, some unsophisticated investors (those paired with
b-funds) would do better by investing in the reservation asset. We do not think that this
requires too much unsophistication from investors for two reasons. First, unsophisticated
investors earn an average return at least as high as that of the alternative asset, since a
fraction p of unsophisticated investors are paired with g-funds. The average return for
unsophisticated investors is:
p(1− e∗g)Rg + (1− p)(1− eU )Rb > p(1− eU )Rg + (1− p)(1− eU )Rb =
= (1− eU )(pRg + (1− p)Rb) = (1− eU )R = 1 (5)
The second reason is that most studies agree that the average actively managed mutual
fund has historically delivered below market returns, at least after expenses and transaction
costs are deducted (see Wermers, 2000, for a recent analysis). In this sense, our model would
seem to require too much, rather than too little, sophistication from investors.
Another possible concern relates to the assumption that unsophisticated investors do
not update their beliefs about funds’ quality based on the fees charged by those funds.
Given that, in a separating equilibrium, good and bad funds set different fees, one may
wonder whether separating equilibria like the ones described above could survive. There
are again two reasons why we are not especially worried by this concern. The first reason
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is theoretical. Although we have assumed that eU is the maximum fee that an investor
would like to pay for a fund of average quality, the proof of Proposition 3 shows that a
separating equilibrium can exist as long as eU > 1 − 1Rb , that is, as long as the maximum
fee that unsophisticated investors are willing to pay is greater than the maximum fee a
sophisticated investor would be willing to pay for a low-quality fund. Therefore, as long as
unsophisticated investors do not fully update their beliefs (i.e., if they do not believe that
a fund setting eU is bad with probability one), separating equilibria can exist. The second
reason is empirical. As we discuss in section 5, the inverse relation between expenses and
performance has been extensively documented. In the survey reported by Alexander et al.
(1997), however, about 20 percent of respondents believed that mutual funds with higher
expenses produced better results, 64.4 percent believed that funds with higher expenses
produced average results, and only 15.7 percent of the survey respondents believed that
higher expenses led to lower-than-average returns. Since the negative relationship between
fees and performance had been already identified by several studies before the survey was
conducted, the survey shows that a significant fraction of investors had not optimally
updated their beliefs. Further, investors’ money, and not just investors’ opinion, seems to
show that a sizeable proportion of them is not making the right investment choices. As
Martin Gruber put it, we see that money remains in funds that can be predicted to do
poorly and that, in fact, do perform poorly (Gruber, 1996, p. 807).
4 Noisy Performance Signals
Throughout the article, we have assumed that, while fund managers knew their expected
performance, the only information available to investors prior to their investment decision
was contained in the fees charged by mutual fund managers. If funds differ in their ability
to generate returns, however, we should expect past returns to convey some information
about fund quality. Therefore, we would like to know if our results are robust to the
existence of a noisy signal of fund quality. Further, if past returns were accurate predictors
of future performance, the very assumption of asymmetric information could be put into
question, so it is important to know to what extent future performance can be predicted
on the basis of information about past returns.
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The empirical evidence shows that significant underperformance is a reasonably good
predictor of future underperformance. In other words, there seems to exist performance
persistence for worst-performing funds. The existence of persistence at the top, however,
remains a hotly debated issue. Grinblatt and Titman (1992) and Hendricks, Patel, and
Zeckhauser (1993), among others, find that previous years’ winners and losers tend to repeat
(this is known as the “hot hand” phenomenon). Carhart (1997), however, questions these
findings, explaining the perceived persistence of top performers in terms of survivorship bias
and the momentum anomaly in the stock market. More recent evidence (see, for instance,
Bollen and Busse, 2005), however, shows that there is some performance persistence at the
top, although this persistence is short lived (not longer than a quarter).
Two conclusions can be drawn from this evidence. First, information on past returns has
some predictive value, although this predictive value is limited. And, second, as evidenced
by the lack of consensus in the literature, the problem of predicting future performance on
the basis of past returns is very complex and requires advanced financial and quantitative
skills. Taken together, these conclusions imply that, for individual investors, past returns
will be, at best, a noisy signal of performance. The limited information conveyed by
past returns also implies that managers may be better informed than investors. In other
words, the observed performance persistence is compatible with the existence of asymmetric
information. Moreover, although the fact that fund managers may be better informed than
investors does not justify assuming that they will, in fact, be better informed, we believe
that one should expect fund managers to have a better assessment than investors about
their expected performance. The reason is twofold. First, fund managers are likely to
possess more advanced financial skills and better research tools than individual investors.
Second, and most importantly, fund managers have access to return-relevant information
not available to investors. For instance, managers continuously observe the composition of
the portfolio they manage, while investors can only observe the fund’s portfolio composition
at some pre-specified moments throughout the year. Fund managers also observe each trade
they make and the transaction costs associated with each of those trades. Further, managers
are likely to have a better idea of their skills, the skills of their staff and the quality of their
research tools. In particular, fund managers can assess the accuracy of their own forecasts
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and, thus, assess whether fund results are due to their investment strategy or to luck.
Finally, fund managers are better informed than investors about the likelihood of future
changes in the fund’s staff (in particular, the probability of their own departure from the
management team) or investment strategy.
The limited value that past returns have for investors as predictors of future perfor-
mance justifies, in our view, making the simplifying approximation that there is, in fact,
no information available to them other than fund fees. To check the robustness of our
results, however, we next extend the model to allow investors to observe a noisy signal of
performance before making their investment decision. In the interest of brevity, we do not
analyze pooling equilibria and focus strictly on whether the results obtained in the previous
section concerning the relationship between fees and fund quality at separating equilibria
still hold when there is a noisy signal of performance.
Suppose that, after funds set fees, investors observe a noisy signal σ of fund quality,
which can take two values, l or h (low or high). Conditional on the fund’s type, σ is
i.i.d. across funds with a probability distribution given by: Pr(l|b) = Pr(h|g) = ν > 1/2.
Therefore,
Pr(g|h) = pν
pν + (1− p)(1− ν) ≡ h > p (6)
Pr(g|l) = p(1− ν)
p(1− ν) + (1− p)ν ≡ l < p (7)
That is, upon observing h the probability of a fund being g is h > p, and, upon observing
l the probability of a fund being g is l < p. The higher ν, the higher h and the lower l and,
thus, the higher the precision of the signal.
While sophisticated investors will optimally condition their investment decision on per-
formance signals and fees, the response of unsophisticated investors to the presence of a
performance signal is less clear a priori. On the one hand, unsophisticated investors may
not respond, or respond too little, to the signal if they do not observe it or underestimate
the amount of information carried by it. On the other hand, unsophisticated investors may
overreact to the signal if they overestimate its precision. To capture the whole possible
range of behavior by unsophisticated investors we assume that the fraction of the wealth
of unsophisticated investors that a fund with a high value (low value) of the signal expects
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to obtain is given by a function fh (fl) of the other funds’ signals. By varying this function
we can account for any degree of responsiveness to the signal by unsophisticated investors.
For example, assuming that N = 2, if unsophisticated investors do not respond to the
signal, then fh(σh) = fh(σl) = fl(σh) = fl(σl) = 12 (where the argument of the function in
each case is the realization of the other fund’s signal). If unsophisticated investors’ invest-
ment choice is fully determined by the signal, then fh(σh) = fl(σl) = 12 , fh(σl) = 1, and
fl(σh) = 0.
Independently of the way in which unsophisticated investors respond to the signal, it is
still the case that, if there exist separating equilibria, then worse-performing funds charge
higher fees. The reason is that, at a separating equilibrium, fees are perfect signals of fund
quality, while σ is only a noisy signal. Therefore, sophisticated investors will optimally
disregard the signal and infer quality from the fee alone. As in previous sections, it follows
that if eg > eb, then it would be profitable for b-funds to imitate g-funds. Therefore, at
any separating equilibrium, eg < eb.
To check whether separating equilibria like the ones described in Proposition 3 exist
in the presence of a signal of fund quality, suppose first that unsophisticated investors
disregard the signal σ. In this case, it is straightforward to check that the conditions that
guarantee existence of a separating equilibrium are exactly identical to the ones derived
in the absence of σ. By the argument in the previous paragraph, the money that a g-
fund expects to obtain from sophisticated investors at a separating equilibrium is exactly
the same as in the absence of the signal, since, at a separating equilibrium, sophisticated
investors can infer fund quality from fees and, thus, optimally disregard the information
contained in σ. Further, the money that any fund can expect to obtain from unsophisticated
investors is γN , which is again the same as in the absence of the signal. Therefore, the
equilibrium conditions are exactly identical to the ones derived in the previous section in
the absence of a signal.9
To analyze the case in which unsophisticated investors condition their investment deci-
sion on the signal, let sk denote the money that a fund of type k expects to obtain from
sophisticated investors at a separating equilibrium and uk the money that it expects to ob-
9Conditions (Pb, NIb’, NIg’, NDb, NDg NDb’, NDg’, and PIg), defined in the appendix.
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tain from unsophisticated investors. With these definitions, we can write the no-imitation
conditions at a separating equilibrium as follows:
(sg + ug)(Rgeg − c) ≥ ug(RgeU − c) (NIg”)
ub(RbeU − c) ≥ (sg + ub)(Rbeg − c), (NIb”)
where the first condition ensures that g-funds do not want to set eU , and the second one
ensures that b-funds do not want to pass as g-funds. In both conditions, sb = 0, since
eU >
Rb−1
Rb
. Note now that if P (h|g) = ν > 1 − ν = Pr(h|b), then ug > ub, since a fund
with σ = h will obtain more money from unsophisticated investors in expectation than a
fund with σ = l, and g-funds are more likely to have a high signal.
To fully characterize a separating equilibrium, we need to check the two no-imitation
conditions above, participation constraints for b-funds and sophisticated investors, and
constraints that ensure that funds do not want to deviate to a fee that is not played in
equilibrium (that is, a fee other than eg or eU ). These conditions are analogous to the
ones derived in the absence of a signal, so we do not rewrite them here. Figures ??-??
display the range of parameter values for which separating equilibria exist for the case
N = 2 and for different values of ν, fl and fh.10 Figure ?? displays the range of values of
c and γ for which separating equilibria exist when the signal is only slightly informative
about the fund’s type. In particular, ν is chosen to be 0.55. In each figure, we consider
three different cases. First, unsophisticated investors ignore the signal, that is, fh(σh) =
fl(σl) = fh(σl) = fl(σh) = 0.5. In this case, represented by the thick solid line, separating
equilibria are identical to the ones in the absence of a signal (since unsophisticated investors
are equally likely to invest with either fund). Second, unsophisticated investors are more
likely to invest in a fund with high signal if the other fund has low signal. In particular,
the thin solid line represents the parameter set compatible with equilibrium when fh(σl) =
0.8 > 0.2 = fl(σh). Finally (dashed lines), we consider the case in which, if the funds
have different signals, unsophisticated investors invest only in the fund with a high signal:
fh(σl) = 1 > 0 = fl(σh). As one could have expected, the range of parameters for which
10Note that, in the figures, Rb < 1. This assumption greatly simplifies the computation of the equilibrium
conditions and is empirically accurate: sophisticated investors would never invest with bad actively managed
funds if they knew their quality. We would be glad to provide the program used to derived the figures upon
request.
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a separating equilibrium exists shrinks as unsophisticated investors become more likely to
invest with funds with a high value of the signal and as the precision of the signal increases,
although the reduction is not severe.
Figures ?? and ?? show what happens as we increase the precision of the signal to
ν = 0.7 and ν = 0.9, respectively.11 The figures show that separating equilibria still exist
for reasonable parameter values in the limit, that is, as the signal becomes extremely precise,
even if the investment decision of unsophisticated investors is completely determined by
the signal. We can, therefore, conclude that the results derived in the previous section are
largely robust to the presence of a noisy signal of performance. It should be noted that if
ν = 0.50, so that the signal is not truly informative, then separating equilibria would be
identical to those derived in the absence of a signal, independently of the degree to which
unsophisticated investors are affected by the signal.
It is worth noting that one could, alternatively, assume that σ is observed by funds
and investors before funds set their fees. This alternative assumption would allow us to
model not just how investors react to noisy performance information, but also how funds
strategically respond to information about their own and other funds’ performance. The
problem with this assumption is that if the signals became public before funds set fees, a
fund’s decision would have to be made contingent not only on its quality and the value of its
signal, but also on the complete profile of other funds’ signals, which greatly complicates the
analysis. Further, fund expenses are empirically much more persistent than performance,
and recent evidence shows that the fees charged for the management of a given fund are
only rarely changed (Kuhnen, 2004). This evidence suggests that not much is lost, and
much is won in terms of tractability, by assuming that fees are set prior to observing the
performance signal.
11Given the empirical literature on performance persistence, ν = 0.55 is a plausible value for the precision
of the signal and ν = 0.7 can be considered as an upper bound for this precision. The value ν = 0.9 is
analyzed as a limiting case.
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5 Evidence on the Relationship between Performance and
Fees
5.1 Mutual Fund Fee Structure
In the market for mutual funds, the fees paid by investors take two forms: periodic fees
(operating expenses) and one-time fees (loads).12 Expenses mostly consist of management
fees, but also include 12b-1 (distribution and marketing) fees, custody fees, and admin-
istrative fees, as well as operating, legal, and accounting costs. They are computed as a
percentage of assets under management–termed the expense ratio–and are deducted on a
daily basis from the fund’s net assets by the managing company. Fees paid to brokers in
the course of the fund’s trading activity are not included in the fund’s expense ratio.
Loads are generally used to pay distributors, and they differ from operating expenses
in that they are paid by the individual investor as a fraction of the amount invested at
the time of purchasing fund shares (sales charge on purchases) or redeeming fund shares
(deferred sales charge). Since fund returns are typically computed from the fund’s net asset
value, quoted returns are net-of-expenses, but before loads.
5.2 Empirical Evidence
The quality of an actively managed fund is commonly defined as the manager’s ability
to deliver returns above those that any investor could obtain following a passive strategy,
such as investing in an index fund. Differences in managerial quality could translate into
differences in after-expense returns if quality were not fully priced. If higher quality were
partly priced, that is, if better funds charged higher expenses, differences in after-expense
returns would be smaller than differences in fees. On the other hand, if high-quality funds
happened to charge lower fees, differences in after-expense returns would be greater than
differences in fees.13
Elton et al. (1993) divide a sample of U.S. mutual funds available in the 1965-84
period into quintiles by expense ratios and measure average after-expense risk-adjusted
12Mahoney (2004) provides a review of mutual fund fee practices and regulation. For a more detailed
description, we suggest that the reader visit the Online Publications section of the SEC internet site.
13If we let ri be the before-expense return of fund i and ei be the expenses charged by this fund, then the
after-expense return ri is given by (1 + ri) = (1− ei)(1 + ri) = 1 + ri − ei − riei ≈ 1 + ri − ei. Therefore,
ri− rj = ri− ei− (rj − ej) = (ej − ei)+ (ri− rj). It follows that if fund j charges a higher fee (ej − ei > 0)
and ri − rj > 0, then ri − rj > 0, that is, fund j must have lower before-expense returns.
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returns14 for funds in each quintile. They find that funds with higher expense ratios
perform significantly worse, and that performance differences between funds in the best
and the worst quintiles exceed differences in fees, which suggests that funds with higher
expenses exhibit lower before-expense returns. Put differently, low-quality funds seem
to be more expensive. Similarly, Gruber (1996) studies cross-section differences in after-
fee performance in the 1985-94 period.15 When ranking funds according to performance,
Gruber (1996) finds that differences in expenses are negatively and significantly correlated
with larger differences in performance.
Harless and Peterson (1998) analyze data employed in early performance studies and
find that the predictive power of expense ratios with respect to performance also extends
to the 1954-64 period. They conclude that “all the studies show that funds with the lowest
expense ratios tend to perform best, and funds with highest expense ratios tend to perform
worst.”
Carhart (1997) proposes a different measure of performance.16 When regressing this
performance measure on expense ratios, he estimates that in the 1962-93 period funds with
annual expenses of 100 basis points above the average had on average 154 basis points
below mean after-expense performance. Again, the effect of fees is to amplify rather than
mitigate differences in before-expense performance.
Finally, Chevalier and Ellison (1999), using a measure of performance similar to Carhart’s
(1997), report that manager and fund characteristics–such as the portfolio turnover ratio
and log of assets–contribute to explaining differences in performance in the 1988-95 period.
When controlling for these variables, they provide estimates of the effect on after-expense
performance of a 100 basis point reduction in expense ratios that range from 152 to 225
basis points.
Put together, the empirical evidence implies that superior management is not priced
14In particular, they measure performance as the intercept term from the regression of annual returns
on three indexes, tracking the evolution of stocks in the S&P 500 index, non-S&P stocks, and bonds. This
measure of performance can be interpreted as the value added by the fund manager with respect to a passive
strategy.
15Gruber (1996) analyzes three alternative proxies for performance: (i) the fund’s average return relative
to the market; (ii) the fund’s average return in excess of the fund’s expected return according to the Capital
Asset Pricing Model; and (iii) the fund’s average excess return according to a four-index model.
16Carhart (1997) employs a four-factor model which captures the fund’s exposure to sources of undiver-
sifiable risk.
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through higher expense ratios. On the contrary, the effect of expenses on after-expense
performance (even after controlling for funds’ observable characteristics) is more than one-
to-one, implying that low-quality funds charge higher fees. Price and quality thus appear
to be inversely related in the market for actively managed mutual funds.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that, in the mutual fund industry, better-quality funds should
not be expected to charge higher prices. Moreover, investors’ limited ability to evaluate
fund quality may lead to equilibria in which worse-performing funds charge higher fees. We
thus obtain a form of inverse price differentiation which is consistent with existing evidence
on mutual fund performance.
The fundamental role played by mutual funds and the current demands for regulatory
action call for further analysis of the mutual fund industry. Our model suggests several
directions for future research. In particular, a richer model of mutual fund competition
should capture a wider set of strategic choices by mutual fund managers. For instance,
while we have taken fund quality as exogenous, mutual fund management companies may,
to some extent, set the quality of the funds they offer through their choice of managers or
their expenditure in market analysis.
Also, funds might try to differentiate themselves through their marketing decisions. One
could expect that old-enough funds with a good performance record could advertise that
performance record to attract unsophisticated investors. Moreover, the theoretical litera-
ture in industrial organization offers additional rationales for the existence of informative
advertising (for a recent review of the literature, see Bagwell, 2005). In the context of the
mutual fund sector, however, our conjecture is that advertising could well be associated
with lower rather than with higher quality. In particular, it may not be difficult for low-
quality funds to advertise on the basis of some measure of performance (such as short term
risk-unadjusted returns). Moreover, it is not clear that it is in the interest of better funds
to advertise. The reason is that while unsophisticated investors are likely to respond to
advertising, sophisticated investors can be expected to be insensitive to advertising, since
they can obtain and process publicly available information about fund performance. There-
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fore, funds catering only to the unsophisticated segment might want to advertise in order
to gain market share in that sector, while better funds might avoid advertising precisely to
distinguish themselves from bad funds. Consistently with this reasoning, Gallaher, Kaniel
and Starks (2006, table 8) have recently found that mutual funds with better performance
do not have larger advertising expenditures, and, for some types of funds, larger advertising
expenditures are associated with lower performance.
Although in this paper we have specifically modelled the market for mutual funds,
the insights of the model may be generalizable to other markets where quality assessment
is costly. The existing empirical evidence on the relationship between quality and price
suggests that the correlation between these two variables is typically not strongly positive
and that, in a significant number of markets, the correlation is indeed negative (e.g., Caves
and Greene, 1996). In our model, the negative correlation between price and quality results
from the combination of asymmetric information about product quality and the presence of
a subset of unsophisticated investors. Future work may further explore, both theoretically
and empirically, how these and other factors affect observed price-quality correlations.
Our results indicate that the complexity associated with the evaluation of fund quality
may, on the one hand, weaken competition, leading to high average fees even in the presence
of a large pool of competing mutual funds, and, on the other hand, lead to a segmented
market in which a fraction of investors pay higher than average fees for underperforming
funds. Whether this state of things could be improved by regulation and the optimal form
of this regulation are questions that merit further scrutiny. Currently, both the SEC and
NASD, the self-regulatory arm of the U.S. securities industry, impose limits on redemption
fees and the loads that can be charged to mutual fund investors to pay for brokerage
services. Our results open the question as to whether some form of cap on expenses could
be beneficial in this context. A less contentious alternative, already having been pursued
by the SEC, is to require that funds improve the disclosure of their fees, so as to allow
investors to realize the dollar cost of the expenses paid. The SEC, however, has stopped
short of requiring funds to periodically disclose to each investor the exact dollar amount of
the expenses paid on the grounds that such a requirement would impose large processing
costs on mutual fund companies. Given the large potential costs that a poor understanding
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of the impact of fees on returns has for unsophisticated investors, our model would suggest
reevaluating this cost-benefit analysis. Our model also suggests that requiring funds to
disclose the level of fees charged by the fund compared to the average or median fees in
the corresponding investment category–information that is already voluntarily disclosed by
some mutual fund management companies–could greatly contribute to prevent funds from
overcharging unsophisticated investors.
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Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 3.
First, notice that eb ≤ Rb−1Rb cannot be an equilibrium fee, as slightly undercutting
such eb would guarantee the deviating b-fund all the sophisticated market in case there are
no g-funds and would only marginally reduce its profits in all other cases. This implies
that, in equilibrium eb > Rb−1Rb , so a necessary condition for the existence of a separating
equilibrium is eU > Rb−1Rb , which is satisfied by eU = 1− 1R .
Next, notice that, if a separating equilibrium exists, e∗b = eU . Any eb ∈ (Rb−1Rb , eU )
cannot be an equilibrium, as such a fee will not convince sophisticated investors to invest
with a b-fund even if all funds turn out to be of type b, and eU yields greater profits from
the unsophisticated investors. Since eb ≤ Rb−1Rb cannot be an equilibrium fee either, the
only possible equilibrium fee for b-funds is e∗b = eU >
c
Rb
.
Given eb = eU > Rb−1Rb , w
U
b =
γ
N , so the participation constraint for b-funds and the
no-imitation constraints read:
γ
N
(RbeU − c) ≥ 0 (Pb)
γ
N
(RbeU − c) ≥ wUg (Rbeg − c) (NIb)
wUg (Rgeg − c) ≥
γ
N
(RgeU − c), (NIg)
where wUg ∈ ( γN , γN + (1− γ)].
The no-imitation constraints can be rewritten:
eg ≥ γ
NwUg
eU + (1− γ
NwUg
)
c
Rg
= αeU + (1− α) c
Rg
(NIg’)
eg ≤ γ
NwUg
eU + (1− γ
NwUg
)
c
Rb
= αeU + (1− α) c
Rb
, (NIb’)
where α ≡ γ
NwUg
. Since wUg >
γ
N , α < 1. Therefore, the incentive constraint (NIb’) implies
that eg < eU , which proves part 3.
Let us assume that sophisticated investors’ beliefs are such that if a fund sets e ∈
[ cRg ,
c
Rb
), it will be believed to be a g-fund, while for any e ≥ cRb (other than g-funds’
equilibrium fee if eg ≥ cRb ), it will be believed to be a b-fund. This implies that eg ∈ ( cRg , cRb ]
cannot be an equilibrium fee. Since eg needs to be strictly greater than cRg , the only possible
equilibrium fees satisfy eg > cRb .
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Let mb be the minimum fee that would make it profitable for a b-fund to deviate if it
captures the whole sophisticated market:( γ
N
+ (1− γ)
)
(Rbmb − c) = γ
N
(RbeU − c), i.e.,,
mb =
γ
N − γ(N − 1)eU +
(
1− γ
N − γ(N − 1)
)
c
Rb
=
= λeU + (1− λ) c
Rb
, (8)
where λ ≡ γN−γ(N−1) < 1.
Similarly, let mg be the minimum fee that would make it profitable for a g-fund to
deviate if it captures the whole sophisticated market:( γ
N
+ (1− γ)
)
(Rgmg − c) = wUg (Rgeg − c) (9)
Rearranging:
mg =
NwUg
γ + (1− γ)N eg +
(
1− Nw
U
g
γ + (1− γ)N
)
c
Rg
= φeg + (1− φ) c
Rg
, (10)
where φ ≡ NwUgγ+(1−γ)N < 1.
Let Mb (Mg) be the be the minimum fee that would make it profitable for a b-fund
(g-fund) to deviate and capture the whole sophisticated market only when there are no
g-funds:
γ
N
(RbeU − c) = (RbMb − c)
( γ
N
+ (1− p)N−1(1− γ)
)
(11)
wUg (Rgeg − c) = (RgMg − c)
( γ
N
+ (1− p)N−1(1− γ)
)
(12)
Notice that these inequalities imply mg < Mg and mb < Mb.
If eg > cRb , the maximum fee that a deviating fund can charge while guaranteeing the
whole sophisticated-investor market with probability one is d ≡ max{eˆ, cRb }, where
eˆ ≡ egRg − (Rg −Rb)
Rb
(13)
is defined by (1− eg)Rg = (1− eˆ)Rb.
Similarly, the maximum fee that a deviating fund can charge while guaranteeing the
whole sophisticated-investor market in case all other funds are of type b is
D ≡ max
{
c
Rb
,
Rb − 1
Rb
}
(14)
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Therefore, the no-deviation conditions for b- and g-funds are, respectively:
mb ≥ d (NDb)
mg ≥ d (NDg)
Mg ≥ D (NDb’)
Mb ≥ D (NDg’)
Finally, eg has to be such that sophisticated investors are willing to invest with g-funds:
eg ≤ Rg − 1
Rg
, (PIg)
which will immediately hold since eU ≤ Rg−1Rg and eg < eU .
An equilibrium will exist if all the inequality conditions (Pb, NIb’, NIg’, NDb, NDg
NDb’, NDg’, and PIg) are satisfied simultaneously.
Given the relatively large number of parameters (Rg, Rb, p, N , c, γ) and inequalities, we
do not fully characterize the set of equilibria. Instead, we next show existence numerically.
Figures ??–?? show parameter regions for which this type of equilibrium exists. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4.
Let ep be the pooling fee and R = pRg+(1−p)Rb denote the unconditional expectation
of gross returns. We will assume that sophisticated investors’ beliefs are such that, if a fund
sets e ∈ [ cRg , cRb ), it will be believed to be a g-fund, while for any e ≥ cRb other than the
equilibrium fee, it will be believed to be a b-fund.
For sophisticated investors to be willing to buy from a fund of unknown type:
ep ≤ 1− 1
R
, (PCip)
i.e., ep ≤ eU .
For b-funds to be willing to participate:
ep ≥ c
Rb
(PCbp)
For a fund of type k not to be willing to deviate and serve the unsophisticated investor
segment only:
1
N
(epRk − c) ≥ γ
N
(eURk − c), or (15)
ep ≥ γeU + (1− γ) c
Rk
(16)
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Since Rg > Rb, it suffices to require
ep ≥ γeU + (1− γ) c
Rb
, (NDu)
which implies PCbp, since, by Assumption 3, eU > cRb .
Let mg and mb be the minimum fees that would make it profitable for a g- or a b-fund,
respectively, to deviate.(
(1− γ) + γ
N
)
(mgRg − c) = 1
N
(epRg − c)(
(1− γ) + γ
N
)
(mbRb − c) = 1
N
(epRb − c)
If we let
N∗ ≡ N(1− γ) + γ, (17)
it follows that:
mg =
1
N∗
ep +
(
1− 1
N∗
)
c
Rg
<
1
N∗
ep +
(
1− 1
N∗
)
c
Rb
= mb,
Now, let e be the maximum fee that would convince investors to shift to a fund believed
to be bad, that is:
(1− e)Rb = (1− ep)R,
or
e = 1− (1− ep) R
Rb
(18)
Therefore, if a fund deviates and sets d ≡ max{e, cRb }, it will capture the whole sophisticated
market, so, for a g-fund not to be willing to deviate, it has to be the case that:
mg ≥ d,
which also implies that b-funds do not want deviate because mb > mg.
Case 1: d = e. Let us first look at the case in which d = e, that is:
1− (1− ep) R
Rb
≥ c
Rb
, or
ep ≥ e˜ ≡ R− (Rb − c)
R
(19)
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In this case the no-deviation condition for g-funds reads:
mg =
1
N∗
ep +
(
1− 1
N∗
)
c
Rg
≥ 1− (1− ep) R
Rb
= e, or
ep ≤ N
∗Rg(R−Rb) + (N∗ − 1)Rbc
Rg(N∗R−Rb)
(20)
For an equilibrium of this sort to exist, thus, conditions (PCip), (NDu), (19) and (20)
have to hold simultaneously.
First note that, given Assumption 2, (19) implies (NDu) for γ low enough. Inspection
of the conditions also shows that for (PCip) and (19) to hold simultaneously it is necessary
that
Rb − c > 1 (21)
If this condition holds, then it only rests to check that (19) and (20) can hold simulta-
neously. This requires:
R− (Rb − c)
R
<
N∗Rg(R−Rb) + (N∗ − 1)Rbc
Rg(N∗R−Rb)
(22)
After some algebra, this condition can be shown to be equivalent to:
Rb < p
(
Rb +Rg
(
Rb −N∗c
(N∗ − 1)c
))
(23)
Therefore, at least for γ low enough (so that we do not have to worry about condition
NDu), if Rb > N∗c, a pooling equilibrium will exist for high enough values of p. Note,
in particular, that existence does not require that γ > 0, so that this type of equilibrium
would also exist in the absence of unsophisticated investors.
Case 2: d = cRb . In equilibrium, d =
c
Rb
if and only if:
ep ≤ R− (Rb − c)
R
(24)
For g-funds not to deviate, we need mg ≥ d = cRb , i.e.,
ep ≥ c
Rg
+N∗c
Rg −Rb
RgRb
, (25)
Thus, for an equilibrium of this sort to exist, conditions (PCip), (NDu), (24), and (25)
must hold. We need to consider two cases:
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1. Rb − c > 1. In this case, condition (PCip) is implied by (24) and conditions (NDu)
and (24) are always compatible for γ low enough since:
R− (Rb − c)
R
>
c
Rb
⇔ RRb −Rb(Rb − c) > cR⇔
R(Rb − c)−Rb(Rb − c) > 0⇔ R−Rb > 0,
which is always true.
It rests to check that conditions (24) and (25) are compatible as well. This will happen
if and only if:
c
Rg
+N∗c
Rg −Rb
RgRb
<
R− (Rb − c)
R
(26)
Rearranging this expression leads to inequality (23), so the same conditions as above
guarantee existence of this type of equilibrium.
2. Rb − c < 1. Now, condition (24) is implied by (PCip). The latter condition will be
consistent with (25) only if:
1− 1
R
>
c
Rg
(
1 +
N∗Rg
Rb
−N∗
)
(27)
For fixed Rb and Rg, the supremum of the left-hand side is 1− 1Rg (when p→ 1). The
infimum of the right-hand side is Rb−1Rg
(
1 + N
∗Rg
Rb
−N∗
)
if Rb > 1 (when c → 1 − Rb ),
and 0 if Rb < 1 (when c→ 0 ). In the latter case, the above condition will hold. If Rb > 1,
we must have:
Rg − 1
Rg
>
Rb − 1
Rg
(
1 +
N∗Rg
Rb
−N∗
)
(28)
Rearranging,
(Rg − 1)Rb > (Rb − 1)(Rb +N∗Rg −N∗Rb)⇔ (29)
Rb <
N∗
N∗ − 1 (30)
Therefore, if (30) holds and Rg−1Rg >
c
Rb
, then there are pooling equilibria with Rb−c < 1.
¥
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